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CASENOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-First Amendment-Freedom of
Press-Florida Right to Reply Statute Does Not Violate First
Amendment Freedom of Press. Tornillo v. Miami Herald Pub-
lishing Co., - Fla. -, 287 So.2d 78 (1973).
A free and unbridled press has long been thought a cornerstone of our
democracy. The vital role of a free press has even been described as the
guarantor of our liberty.' Accordingly, in the absence of a compelling
state interest, statutes prohibiting any type of publication are presumed un-
constitutional.2  While recognizing that there is a right to publish without
prior governmental restraint s there is also a correlative first amendment
guarantee that the public be fully informed on matters of public concern.
4
When newspaper publishers deny access to individuals seeking to express
themselves on public issues, these countervailing first amendment safe-
guards come into conflict. This first amendment anomaly arose in Tor-
nillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co.5
Appellant, a candidate for the state legislature, requested that appellee
print verbatim his replies to two editorials in the Miami Herald relating
to his candidacy for public office; the newspaper refused. Relying upon a
1. One court has stressed that: "[O]ur liberty depends on the freedom of the press
and that cannot be limited without being lost." State ex rel. Singleton v. Woodruff,
153 Fla. 84, 13 So. 2d 704, 706 (1963), quoting Thomas Jefferson.
2. See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945); Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1, 7 (1945).
3. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); New York Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943);
Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
4. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964), quoting from,
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957), the Court declared:
The general proposition that freedom of expression upon public questions is
secured by the First Amendment has long been settled by our decisions. The
constitutional safeguard, we have said, 'was fashioned to assure unfettered in-
terchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes de-
sired by the people' . ...
5. Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., - Fla. -, 287 So. 2d 78, petition
for rehearing denied, - Fla. at -, 287 So. 2d at 89 (1973), juris postponed, 42
U.S.L.W. 3400 (Jan. 14, 1974) (No. 73-797).
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Florida statute,8 appellant initiated suit in the Florida Circuit Court for Dade
County, seeking a mandatory injunction requiring the printing of his re-
sponse, declaratory relief and damages.7 The circuit court dismissed ap-
pellant's cause, declaring the statute violative of the federal8 and state9
constitutions. In reversing the circuit court, the Florida Supreme Court held
that the statute "enhances rather than abridges" freedom of speech and
press and thus is not unconstitutional. The court explained that the statute
does not constitute an infringement of first amendment rights since it does
not exclude any specified newspaper content, but rather requires additional
material in the interest of maintaining conditions conducive to free and fair
elections. Judge Boyd's dissenting opinion expressed the view that since
the first amendment prohibits the government from limiting the right to
publish news and to comment editorially, it also prevents the government
from compelling a publisher to print another person's statement against the
publisher's will.
While there are several issues presented by Tornillo,10 it is the purpose
6. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.38 (1973), amending FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.38 (1951),
provides in significant part:
If any newspaper in its columns assails the personal character of any candi-
date for nomination or for election in any election, or charges said candi-
date with malfeasance or misfeasance in office . . . such newspaper shall
upon request of such candidate immediately publish free of cost any reply he
may make thereto . . . Any person or firm failing to comply with the pro-
visions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor ....
7. Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., - Fla. at -, 287 So. 2d at 79.
In view of the nature of the relief requested, the trial court granted plaintiff's
request for an emergency hearing on October 2, 1972. Pursuant to FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 96.091 (Supp. 1973), amending § 87.10 (1959), the Attorney General
of Florida was advised that appellant intended to contest the constitutionality vel
non § 104.38 and was represented at the hearing. At the hearing, the Attorney Gen-
eral advised the trial court that he had refused to appeal a decision by Volusia County
Judge Durden which had held § 104.38 unconstitutional (State v. News-Journal, 36 Fla.
Supp. 164 (Volusia County, Fla., Judges Ct. 1972)) because the Attorney General him-
self had reservations about the constitutionality of the statute. He further advised the
trial court that his position was unchanged and that he continued to have doubts as
to the constitutionality of § 104.38, and therefore would not defend the statute. Brief
for Appellee at 2, Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., - Fla. -, 287 So. 2d 78
(1973).
8. U.S. CONsT. amend. I, which is applied to the states through the fourteenth
amendment, provides in significant part: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging
the freedom of speech, or the press .... "
9. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 4 provides: "Every person may speak, write and publish
his sentiments on all subjects but shall be responsible for the abuse of that right. No
law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press."
10. The trial court concluded that the Florida statute was also unconstitutional be-
cause it was impermissibly vague and indefinite. Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publishing
Co., - Fla. at -, 287 So. 2d at 80. In reversing, the supreme court indicated that
"the statute is sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it as to what




of this note to analyze the concept of first amendment freedoms in rela-
tion to a state-fashioned right of reply. The principal question to con-
sider is whether a state "right to reply" statute, which requires newspapers
to publish, without charge, replies of political candidates whom they criti-
cize during election campaigns is violative of the first amendment freedom
of the press."1
An Unfettered Institution
The vast majority of judicial decisions which have tested various statutes
against first amendment guarantees have concerned statutory restrictions
upon publication. Unless these restrictions were justified by a clear and
present danger to a compelling state interest, the statutes consistently were
voided. 12  Constitutional litigation concerning attempted regulation of the
press usually involves governmental attempts to restrict or forbid publica-
tion.'8 The strongly embedded prohibition against unwarranted censorship
of the press was recently applied to prohibit the government from restrain-
ing the publication even of classified documents alleged to be vital to the
national security.'
4
Although the government cannot limit what a newspaper may print,
it can be argued that regulations which affirmatively require publication
somehow stand on a different constitutional footing. If there is a dif-
ference between compelling publication of material that the newspaper
It is a fundamental principle that this Court has the duty, . . . to resolve all
doubts as to the validity of a statute in favor of its constitutionality and if
reasonably possible a statute should be construed so as not to conflict with
the constitution. Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., - Fla. at -, 287
So. 2d at 85.
See also Overstreet v. Blum, 227 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 1969); Hancock v. Sapp, 225 So.
2d 411 (Fla. 1969); Rich v. Ryals, 212 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1968).
Preliminarily, the trial court also determined that the statutory provision in question
was a criminal statute and that absent special circumstances, equity will not ordinarily
enjoin commission of a crime. See Pompano Horse Club Co. v. State ex rel. Bryan,
93 Fla. 415, 111 So. 801 (1927); Annot., 52 A.L.R. 51 (1928). The supreme court
stated that the action underlying appellant's cause is a civil action. No criminal pen-
alty was sought in the case and, therefore, the validity vel non of the criminal
penalty was not involved. Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., - Fla. at -,
287 So. 2d at 90.
11. The term "first amendment" is used herein as referring to the first amendment
as made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Near v. Min-
nesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931).
12. See, e.g., Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (ordinance prohibiting
breach of peace); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948) (statute forbidding pub-
lications concerning "deeds of bloodshed and lust"); Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95
(1948) (statute forbidding publication advocating polygamy.)
13. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Lamont
v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
14. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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wishes not to print and prohibiting a newspaper from printing news or
other material, then perhaps governmental regulations requiring publica-
tion should not have to meet the same constitutional standards as regula-
tions prohibiting publication. In the rare instances when the courts have
addressed these questions, however, they have rejected any concept that
a newspaper may be compelled to publish material against its will.
For example, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts recently ren-
dered an advisory opinion15 declaring unconstitutional a proposed statute
which provided, in essence, that if a newspaper publishes a paid political
advertisement, it cannot refuse to publish paid political advertising advo-
cating a contrary view. 16 While observing that "[f]reedom of the press
does not mean that the press may not be subjected to reasonable regula-
tion,"'17 the court found the proposal in violation of the first amendment
because requiring a newspaper -to print is the equivalent of censorship.1 8
Compelling publication was also faced in Associates & Aldrich Co. v.
Times Mirror Co.,19 in which a movie distributor claimed that his first
amendment rights were violated by the newspaper's refusal to accept cer-
tain proffered advertising without modifications requested by the newspa-
per. In rejecting the claim of infringement on first amendment rights, the
Ninth Circuit declared:
15. Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, - Mass. -, 298 N.E.2d 829 (Mass. 1973).
16. - Mass. at-, 298 N.E.2d at 830. MAss. H.R. Doc. No. 3460 (1973). The bill
in question would have amended Violations of Elections Law, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 56 (1959) by inserting after section 39 of that chapter, sections 39A and 39B. Id. at
830-31.
17. - Mass. at -, 298 N.E.2d at 832. The court stated: "Clearly the press has no
special immunity from civil and criminal laws which relate to its business aspects." id.
See, e.g., Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937); Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S.
178, 184 (1946); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682-83 (1972); Pittsburgh Press
Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
18. The court stated, "[Clompulsion to publish all responsive political advertise-
ments, applicable to all newspapers ...goes beyond what is essential to the further-
ance of any interest of estate in its citizens having a right of access to newspapers
- Mass. at -, 298 N.E.2d at 835. See also Avins v. Rutgers, State University
of New Jersey, 385 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968) (reject-
ing demand that state-supported university's law review must be compelled to publish
article of taxpayer); Resident Participation of Denver, Inc. v. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1100
(D. Colo. 1971) (rejecting contention that newspapers can be required to furnish free
space for expression of citizens' views).
Most jurisdictions hold that a newspaper, acting alone, is commonly at liberty to
reject advertising as it sees fit. Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 1286 (1968). See Commonwealth
v. Boston Transcript Co., 249 Mass. 477, 144 N.E. 400 (1924); J.J. Gordon, Inc. v.
Worcester Telegram Pub. Co., 343 Mass. 142, 177 N.E.2d 586 (1961).
This, however, does not prevent a state from regulating the rates for political adver-
tisements. See, e.g., Chronicle & Gazette Pub. Co. v. Attorney General, 94 N.H.
148, 48 A.2d 478 (1946), appeal dismissed, 329 U.S. 690, sustaining the validity of
N.H. LAWS ch. 185, § 2 (1945). Here, no compulsion to publish is involved.
19. 440F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1971).
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There is no difference between compelling publication of mate-
rial that the newspaper wishes not to print and prohibiting a news-
paper from printing news or other material.
20
In Chicago Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Chicago Tri-
bune Co.,21 the court upheld the newspaper's refusal to publish adver-
tisements submitted to it by the union which presented the union's views
on a labor dispute in which it was engaged. 22  The clothing workers' first
amendment right to free speech was not sufficient to give them access to
the newspaper's printing presses without the newspaper's consent.
Thus, in terms of the inviolability of the "free press" concept, another
issue must be considered. An analysis of these cases suggest that the
press does not necessarily have a public responsibility to present both sides
of an important issue. Rather, the press should strictly remain an unfet-
tered institution to be used as its owner pleases.
28
The Right of Viewers
A series of cases which have denied the existence at common law of a
right of access to the press to respond or to publish advertising have sug-
gested, however, that legislation providing for such a right would be per-
missible.2 4  In Approved Personnel Inc. v. Tribune Co.,2 5 a Florida court
recognized the great weight of authority upholding the rights of newspapers
to reject advertisements. The court indicated, however, that the law is
settled on this point only in the absence of statutory regulations on the
subject.2
0
The state action problem has been a significant factor in cases in-
20. 440 F.2d at 135.
21. 435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1971).
22. The court stated:
It is urged that the privilege of First Amendment protection afforded a news-
paper carries with it a reciprocal obligation to serve as a public forum, and
if a newspaper accepts any editorial advertising it must publish all lawful edi-
torial advertisements .... We do not understand this to be the concept of
freedom of the press recognized in the First Amendment .... 435 F.2d at
478.
23. See Note, State Control of Political Advertisements, 7 SuFFoLK. L. REv. 711,
716 (1973).
24. See, e.g., Approved Personnel, Inc. v. Tribune Co., 177 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 1st
D.C.A. 1965); Friedenberg v. Times Pub. Co., 170 La. 3, 127 So. 345 (1930); In re
Louis Wohl, Inc., 50 F.2d 254 (E.D. Mich. 1931); Poughkeepsie Buying Service, Inc.
v. Poughkeepsie Newspapers, Inc., 205 Misc. 982, 131 N.Y.S.2d 515 (1954).
25. 177 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1965).
26. The court noted, "In the absence of any statutory provisions to the contrary,
. the newspaper publishing business . . . is neither a public utility nor affected
with the public interest." 177 So. 2d at 706. See also Annot., 18 AL.R.3d 1277
(1968).
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volving newspapers in which there has been no legislation affording access
or a right. 27  At the federal district court level, Judge Marovitz was un-
willing to judicially fashion a right of access to the press. 28  The court
did indicate, however, some sensitivity to the problems that have developed
or may arise because of a lack of access to the marketplace of ideas. Addi-
tionally, the court seemed to suggest that it would approve enforcement of a
right of access if it were provided by statute. "If, in fact, concentra-
tions of private media power are stultifying, the appropriate approach to
secure a right of access would be by 'experimental, innovative legisla-
tion' . . .29
In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 0 a case involving a radio broadcast,
the United States Supreme Court suggested the enactment of right of reply
legislation as an alternative to damage suits for libel in cases where public
issues are involved. In a plurality opinion,3' the Court reasoned: "If the
States fear that private citizens will not be able to respond adequately to
publicity involving them, the solution lies in the direction of ensuring their
ability to respond, rather than in stifling public discussion of matters of public
concern." 32 Since the concept of a right of reply has many variations, 33 it is
conceivable that some type of "reply" statute could be drafted which could
meet the test of the first amendment. For example, an optional right of
27. See, e.g., Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102, 105 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
28. Chicago Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Chicago Tribune Co., 307
F. Supp. 422 (N.D. Ill. 1969), afi'd, Chicago Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing Work-
ers v. Chicago Tribune, 435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970). See note 21 supra and accom-
panying text.
29. 307 F. Supp. at 429, quoting from, Barron, Access to the Press-A New First
Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1670, 1676 (1967). Barron believes that
the right of the public to hear is the real purpose of the first amendment. He con-
tends that the newspaper market is monopolistic, and that to further the free flow of
ideas, it is necessary to pass legislation requiring newspapers to provide access for
competing ideas.
30. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
31. Mr. Justice Brennan announced the decision of the Court joined only by Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun. The Court rendered a total of five opinions.
32. 403 U.S. at 47. To this comment, the Court appended the following footnote:
Some States have adopted retraction statutes or right-of-reply statutes. See
Donnelly, The Right of Reply: An Alternative to an Action for Libel, 34
VA. L. REV. 867 (1948); Note, Vindication of the Reputation of a Public Of-
ficial, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1730 (1967); Cf. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367 (1969). Id. n.15.
33. See, e.g., Chafee, Possible New Remedies for Errors in the Press, 60 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1946); and Donnelly, The Right of Reply: An Alternative to an Action for
Libel, 34 VA. L. REV. 867 (1948). In addition to FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.38, there
appear to have been only two similar "right of reply" statutes enacted in the United
States; Miss. CODE ANN. § 3175 (1942) and NEv. REV. STAT. sec. 200.570 (1963).
The Mississippi statute was eviscerated in Manasco v. Walley, 63 So. 2d 91 (Miss.
1953). Nevada repealed its mandatory right of reply statute in 1969 and replaced
it with 4 retraction statute,
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reply statute for libelous publications might be provided as an alternative
to the publication of a retraction as a basis for barring recovery of punitive
damages for libel against a newspaper which published such a reply or
retraction . 4  Such a statute would not raise the serious constitutional ques-
tions of a more general reply statute outside the libel context. The Court
has never ruled directly upon a state statute requiring newspaper publica-
tion of a reply. It is therefore unclear that Metromedia, which involved
a radio broadcast, intended to suggest the constitutionality of right of reply
legislation when applied to newspapers.
The Court, however, has recognized the constitutionality of a govern-
mental mandate to publish specific items in connection with the "fairness
doctrine" as applied to radio and television stations by the Federal Commu-
nications Commission.3 5 While the traditional rationale for upholding equal
time provisions on television and radio is based on the fact that there exist
only a limited number of air waves over which broadcasts can be made,
and that, as a result, broadcasting technical limitations sanction broadcast-
ing regulations,3 6 the Court in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,3 7
stressed:
It is the right of viewers and listeners, not the right of the broad-
casters which is paramount . . . . It is the purpose of the First
Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in
which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance
monopolization of that market, whether by the government itself or
a private licensee.38
A Constitutional Soapbox
The Tornillo court declared: "The public 'need to know' is most critical
34. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.05 which provides that publication of a reply
in lieu of a retraction prohibits a recovery against a newspaper in a defamation action
other than actual damages. There is, however, a fundamental difference between
Wisconsin's statute and the right of reply statute at issue in Tornillo: the former is
permissive, mitigating damages if a reply is published and thus encouraging freedom
of expression: the latter, by contrast, is mandatory thereby controlling the exercise
of editorial discretion. See Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 19, Miami Herald Pub.
Co. v. Tornillo, juris postponed, (Jan. 14, 1974) (No. 73-797).
35. The Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1970), states
in pertinent part:
If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate
for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal op-
portunities to all other candidates for that office in the use of such broadcast
ing station.
36. Note, State Control of Political Advertisements, 7 SUFFoLK L. REv. 711, 717
(1973).
37. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
38. Id. at 390.
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during an election campaign."3 9  Agreeing with the thesis propounded by
Barron,40 the court further opined that "[T]he right of the public to
know . . . is being jeopardized by the growing concentration of the own-
ership of the mass media into fewer and fewer hands, resulting ultimately
in a form of private censorship."
'41
Indeed, climbing up on a soapbox and attracting a small crowd is no
longer considered to be a very effective method of expression, especially
when newspaper circulations reach millions. 42  In this context, a right of
reply statute might seem necessary to guarantee the first amendment idea
that "[D]ebate on public issue should be uninhibited, robust and wide-
open."' 43  Tornillo carefully explained that the statute does not constitute
an incursion upon first amendment rights since it does not deny the news-
papers any right of expression, but rather requires additional information in
the interest of full and fair discussion. The Tornillo court heeded the lan-
guage of Red Lion that:
Congress does not abridge freedom of speech or press by legis-
lation. . . multiplying the voices and views presented to the pub-
lic through time sharing, fairness doctrines, or other devices which
limit or dissipate the power of those who sit astride the channels
of communication . . .44
While it can be argued that it is possible to draw an analogy between Flor-
ida's right of reply statute and FCC regulations providing a similar right,
45
this argument would seem to ignore the long-established constitutional dis-
tinction between broadcast media and the press. Characteristic of this dis-
tinction is the Ninth Circuit's refusal to apply the fairness doctrine to news-
papers to compel publication of an editorial advertisement." That such a
39. Tornillo v. Miami Herald Pub. Co., - Fla. at -, 287 So. 2d at 80.
40. See note 29 supra.
41. Tornillo v. Miami Herald Pub. Co., - Fla. at -, 287 So. 2d at 82-83.
42. Supra note 36.
43. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
44. 395 U.S. at 401 n.28.
45. The FCC's "personal attack" regulations, which are a corollary to its fairness
doctrine, provide in significant part:
When, during the presentation of views on a controversial issue of public im-
portance, an attack is made upon the honesty, character, integrity, or like per-
sonal qualities of an identified person or group, the licensee shall . . . trans-
mit to the person or group attacked . . . an offer of a reasonable opportu-
nity to respond over the licensee's facilities. 47 C.F.R. sec. 73.123 (1971).
46. The court discussed the matter as follows:
[D]ifferences in the characteristics of news media justify differences in the
First Amendment standards applied to them . . . . Where there are substan-
tially more individuals who want to broadcast than . . . frequencies to allo-
cate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast
[Vol. 23:621
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distinction does exist was recently reemphasized by the Supreme Court in
Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic National Committee47 in which
the Court noted that the measure of freedom accorded to broadcasters is
"not as large as that exercised by a newspaper. ' 48 The Court noted the
unique problems posed by the broadcast media, stating, "Unlike other me-
dia, broadcasting is subject to an inherent physical limitation. '49  While it
can be asserted that there are many more broadcasting stations than there
are daily newspapers, 50 and that newspapers also enjoy government con-
ferred privileges, 51 it is perhaps also true that the development of constitu-
tional doctrine should be based neither on the hysterical over-estimation
of media power 52 nor on the failure to distinguish between regulation of the
expression of ideas and regulation of the commercial aspects of a newspa-
per's operation.53
Tornillo can be distinguished from Times Mirror in that the latter did
not concern a statutory provision requiring publication to further a com-
pelling interest. The Tornillo statute's validity was predicated on the
overriding state interest in the integrity of the electoral process.
54  It
comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish.
440 F.2d 133, 136 (9th Cir. 1971), quoting from, Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-88 (1969).
The court continued: Unlike broadcasting, the publication of a newspaper is not a
government conferred privilege. 440 F.2d at 136. See note 19 supra and ac-
companying text.
47. 413 U.S. 94 (1973) (denying the Democratic National Committee's request for
a declaratory ruling from the FCC that the Communications Act or the first amendment
precluded a licensee from having a general policy of refusing to sell time to responsible
entities to present their views on public issues). For a discussion of the Columbia
Broadcasting case, see Note, The CBS Decision: Access to the Media Denied, 23 CATI.
U.L. REV. 339 (1974).
48. 413 U.S. at 117-18. The Court further stated: "[The power of a privately
owned newspaper to advance its own ... views is bounded by only two factors: . . .
the acceptance of a sufficient number of readers . . . to assure financial success; and,
. . . the journalistic integrity of its editors and publishers." Id. at 117.
49. Id. at 101.
50. In addition to the three national commercial networks as of April 1st, 1970,
there were, on the air, 509 commercial VHF television stations, 180 commercial UHF
stations, 4,280 standard broadcast stations, and 2,111 commercial FM stations. By
comparison, there are only 1,792 daily newspapers in the United States. See Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 144 nn.13-
14 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring).
51. Newspapers and other periodicals receive a government subsidy in the form of
second-class postage rates. 39 C.F.R. § 132 (1973). A limited antitrust immunity is
established by the Newspaper Preservation Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq. (1970).
52. See Jaffe, The Editorial Responsibility of the Broadcaster: Reflections on Fair-
ness & Access, 85 HARv. L. REV. 768, 786-87 (1972).
53. See, e.g., United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 211 (4th Cir. 1972). See also
Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 414 (1970); Note, Freedom of Expres-
sion in a Commercial Context, 78 HAnv. L. REV. 1191, 1192, 1194-95 (1965).
54. In Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966), the Supreme Court declared unconsti-
tutional a state statute prohibiting publication on election day of editorials concerning
1974]
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is necessary, however, to consider the implications of this opinion for
further regulation of the press. In Opinion of the Justices,55 the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court also recognized that the proposed statute56
was intended to foster discussion of political issues and facilitate expression
of all views. Nevertheless, the court found that in actual effect the statute's
enactment "may produce the chilling effect of discouraging newspapers
• . . from accepting any political advertisements."
57
The Florida statute can be distinguished if the premise is accepted that
the opportunity for counterattack ought to be at the very heart of a consti-
tutional theory which is concerned with ensuring vigorous debate on public
issues. The emphatic language used by the Massachusetts court to deny an
obligation to publish suggests that such a distinction might not be material
as least for that court: "[N]o set of circumstances may exist which would
support a legislative mandate that a newspaper . . . must publish a political
advertisement. s58 Nor would the legislative interest in promoting the flow
of expression of political views ever seem desirable at the expense of allowing
the government to assume the editorial function. While the precise form
of governmental regulation as issue in Tornillo may differ from that involved
in Opinion of the Justices, the question presented is exactly the same. Both
manifestly require the suspension of editorial discretion and permit the
government through regulation to dictate the contents of a newspaper's
columns.
A Free Press or Community Bulletin Boards
The Tornillo decision suggests that the best prospects for the emergence
of a right of reply in the press are in those narrowly prescribed circum-
stances when the character of a candidate for public office has been at-
tacked. It may be that while there is no constitutional duty for a court to
provide a right of reply, a statute affording such a right cannot be deemed
unconstitutional when a state has enacted it to promote a compelling in-
terest.
The disagreement between the highest courts of Massachusetts and Flori-
da on the validity of statutes creating the right of access to newspapers for
political candidates indicates that states will disagree as to what constitutes
a sufficiently compelling interest to justify an obligation to publish. With-
the election. The Court rejected the state's argument that the statute was reasonable
and intended to prevent last minute charges to which a candidate could not reply.
55. - Mass. -, 298 N.E.2d 829 (Mass. 1973).
56. See note 16 supra.
57. - Mass. at -, 298 N.E.2d at 834.
58. - Mass. at -, 298 N.E.2d at 835.
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out a more decisive United States Supreme Court endorsement of right of
reply statutes than that offered by the plurality in Metromedia, many
state courts will be reluctant to follow Tornillo.
At a time when too much of our public business appears to be con-
ducted in an atmosphere of concealment, any device designed to present "the
whole story" seems palatable. There is, however, the possibility that the
Florida statute will produce the same "chilling effect" feared by the Mas-
sachusetts court. Then, the historical purpose of a free press to "bare the
secrets of government and inform the people" 60 would be ill-served.
If a state sees a compelling interest in requiring publication of replies
by attacked political candidates, is it not conceivable that a state will also
perceive such an interest in legislation affording any public official the
right to reply to publications critical of his conduct in office?61  The
next step could be legislation demanding a newspaper to publish the reply
of anyone who felt he was criticized by the press. The courts must take
care not to extend Tornillo in this manner. If the courts do not take
pains to prevent an extension of Tornillo, this could lead to the replace-
ment of our traditional free press with publications resembling commun-
ity bullletin boards.
Ernest W. DuBester
TORTS-Negligent Infliction of Emotional Harm-No Impact
Required When Plaintiff Himself Is Put In Physical Peril.
Hughes v. Moore, 214 Va. 27, 197 S.E.2d 214 (1973).
Tort law has struggled for nearly a century with the question of a plain-
tiff's right to recover for negligently inflicted emotional harm.1 The "im-
59. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
60. 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971).
61. For a similar conclusion, see Petitioner's Brief for Rehearing at 12, Tornillo
v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., - Fla. -, 287 So. 2d 78 (1973).
1. Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892); Mitchell
v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896); Mack v. South Bound R.R.,
52 S.C. 323, 29 S.E. 905 (1898) are illustrative of early decisions on the subject.
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pact rule"'2 was a late nineteenth century development of courts attempt-
ing to deal with the problem. The Supreme Court of Virginia considered
the rule recently in Hughes v. Moore,3 and the decision indicates that while
its original thrust has changed, controversy still surrounds the rule's mod-
ern day application.
Plaintiff sought to recover damages for injuries she received (princi-
pally physical pain, insomnia, and extreme nervousness) from shock and
fright. Her fear was allegedly caused by the defendant's negligently
driving his car off the road, across plaintiff's front lawn, and directly toward
the window of the house through which the plaintiff was watching. While
the car struck the front porch, plaintiff herself received no physical im-
pact.4  She was awarded $12,000 by the jury and the defendant appealed
the judgment entered on the verdict.
Answering the basic question of whether, in the absence of a willful,
wanton or vindictive wrong, a plaintiff can collect for emotional distress
without contemporaneous injury, the appellate court reinterpreted Virgin-
ia's "impact rule" and held that the plaintiff could collect without physical
impact as long as "there is shown a clear and unbroken chain of causal con-
nection between the negligent act, the emotional disturbance, and the physical
injury."5
In an effort to restate the Virginia "impact rule" in complete detail,
the court added a limitation to the rule which was not part of its precise
holding under the Hughes facts. It specifically noted that its rule did not
extend to recovery for those injured from shock at the viewing of a defend-
ant's negligence toward a third person.6 That limitation, its underlying
rationale, and the arguments made -for its removal will be the primary fo-
cus of this article.
2. The rule was well-stated in Spade v. Lynn & B. R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 290, 47
N.E. 88, 89 (1897):
inhere can be no recovery for fright, terror . .. if these are unaccom-
panied by some physical injury [nor] for such physical injuries as may
be caused solely by such mental disturbance where there is no injury to the
person from without.
3. 214 Va. 27, 197 S.E.2d 214 (1973).
4. For a similar fact pattern where the court found the tremor from the car's im-
pact with the house insufficient to satisfy the "impact rule" see Bowman v. Williams,
164 Md. 397, 165 A. 182 (1933).
5. 214 Va. at 34, 197 S.E.2d at 219.
6. For an indication that this limitation, while making the court's basic intention
clear, leaves several questions unanswered see Hopper v. United States, 244 F. Supp.
314 (D. Colo. 1965) (recovery under Colorado law contingent on plaintiff being within
zone of danger); Resavage v. Davies, 199 Md. 479, 86 A.2d 879 (1952) (recovery
denied since witness was not imperiled herself); Lessard v. Tarca, 20 Conn. Supp. 295,
133 A.2d 625 (1957) (recovery denied witnesses even though they received physical
injuries in the same accident).
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Development of the "Impact Rule"
Its General Background
The evolution of the "impact rule" began with the English decision, Vic-
torian Railways Commissioners v. Coultas,7 which established the principle
that no damages would be awarded for emotional distress resulting from
terror, without physical injury. The early United States view adopted this
precedent. It is typified by a leading New York case,8 in which the
plaintiff, a pedestrian, suffered a miscarriage as a result of narrowly avoid-
ing a collision with the defendant's horse drawn car. There the court
stated:
The injuries to the plaintiff were plainly the result of an accidental
or unusual combination of circumstances, which could not have
been reasonably anticipated, and over which the defendant had
no control, and hence her damages were too remote to justify a
recovery in this action. 9
The inequities of the strict application of the rule gradually became
apparent to the courts which had adopted it, and its strictures began to
ease, with the most nominal impact being held sufficient to allow recov-
ery for harms having no real connection to the impact itself.10
The courts eventually began to eliminate the impact requirement alto-
gether, at least with regard to plaintiffs who themselves were in imminent
physical danger. To date a majority of jurisdictions which have considered
the rule have either rejected it on first impression or abandoned it upon
reconsideration." The reasoning in Niederman v. Brodsky12 is illustra-
tive of the modern approach to the impact/no-impact question:
[T]he gravity of appellant's injury . . . dictate[s] that appellant
7. 13 App. Cas. 222 (P.C. 1888). For an extensive analysis of the English
case law on the "impact rule," see Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69
Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
8. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
9. Id. at 110, 45 N.E. at 355; see also Wyman v. Leavitt, 71 Me. 227 (1880); Ewing
v. Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry., 147 Pa. 40, 23 A. 340 (1892); Spade v. Lynn &
B.R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897). Contra, Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry., 48
Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892) ("Now, if the fright was the natural consequence
of . . . the circumstances of peril . . . and the fright caused the nervous shock and
convulsions and consequent illness, the negligence was the proximate cause of those
injuries." Id. at 138, 50 N.W. at 1035); Mack v. South Bound R.R., 52 S.C. 323, 29
S.E. 905 (1898); Kimberly v. Howland, 143 N.C. 398, 55 S.E. 778 (1906).
10. Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N.Y. 231, 177 N.E. 431 (1931) ("IT]he direct physi-
cal injury may be insignificant in relation to the damages consequent upon the fright."
Id. at 238, 177 N.E. at 433); Potere v. City of Philadelphia, 380 Pa. 581, 112 A.2d
100 (1955) (driver received sprained ankle from road collapse under his truck, he
quickly got out of truck, and was awarded $5,000 for mental distress received when
the truck then fell 19 feet into resulting cavity).
11. 214 Va. at 34, 197 S.E.2d at 219.
12. 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970) (defendant's car skidded onto sidewalk hitting
plaintiff's son as the two walked along, inducing severe heart damage to the plaintiff).
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be afforded a chance to present his case to a jury and perhaps be
compensated for the injury he has incurred.
[We abandon the impact requirement] in only those cases like
the one before us where the plaintiff was in personal danger of
physical impact because of the direction of a negligent force
against him and where plaintiff actually did fear the physical im-
pact.'
3
The Niederman limitation on foreseeable plaintiffs provides the basis
of the rule which prohibits witnesses of a negligent act from recovering
for their emotional injuries, and is indicative of the majority opinion in the
United States on the question. 14  The rule is designed to meet situations
similar to that in Waube v. Warrington,5 the leading American deci-
sion on the subject. There, a mother, watching from inside her home,
saw her daughter killed when struck by a car negligently driven by the de-
fendant. The court denied recovery for emotional injury suffered by the
plaintiff on several grounds: (1) the risk of this type of injury was not
foreseeable by the defendant; (2) the liability to be imposed on the de-
fendant would be disproportionately greater than his culpability; (3) the
imposition of such liability would put too heavy a burden on the highway
user: (4) the greater potential for fraudulent claims: and (5) the
non-existence of limits for this type of liability.' While that deci-
sion has almost invariably been followed, its effect has been softened.
Courts have frequently adopted a more lenient "zone of danger" test
whereby as long as the plaintiff is in physical peril himself he can collect
for emotional injuries occasioned by his fear of injury to another.'
7
The artificiality of that "zone of danger" test was directly attacked in
Dillon v. Legg,"' in which the California Supreme Court rejected the Waube
rationale and, faced with the classic fact pattern of a mother in the home
viewing her child being killed, allowed the mother to recover damages for
her emotional injuries. After first dealing with the question of fraudulent
claims,' 9 the opinion attempted to meet the Waube objections to extend-
13. id. at 404, 413, 261 A.2d at 85, 90.
14. Cases cited note 16 infra.
15. 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
16. Id. at 613, 258 N.W. at 501; see also Barber v. Pollock, 104 N.H. 379, 187
A.2d 788 (1963) (wife viewed accident killing husband from inside house one hundred
feet from scene); Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554
(1969) (child struck by car, and while mother was not an eyewitness she was close
by).
17. The Waube decision itself hinted at this line of reasoning. It defined the issue
in the case in terms of whether a mother "not put in peril or fear of physical
impact" could recover for injuries sustained by witnessing the event. 216 Wis.
at 605, 258 N.W. at 497.
18. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
19. "mhe possibility that fraudulent assertions may prompt recovery in isolated cases
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ing recovery. It countered each by calling for a general negligence ap-
proach to the facts in a particular case, and offered guidelines to aid in de-
termining foreseeability. The latter included whether the plaintiff was
near the scene of the accident; whether the shock was the result of a
contemporaneous observance of the accident rather than a second-hand
reaction to learning of its occurrence; and the relationship between the vic-
tim and the plaintiff. 20  The decision contemplated that "courts, on a case-
to-case basis, analyzing all the circumstances, will decide what the ordinary
man under such circumstances should reasonably have foreseen. The
courts thus mark out the areas of liability, excluding the remote and un-
expected."' 21  In general the decision rested on the view that the court
"[saw] no good reason why the general rules of tort law, including the con-
cepts of negligence, proximate cause, and foreseeability, long applied to all
other types of injury, should not govern the case .... ,,22
The Dillon approach to emotional distress cases has been adopted in
several later cases; 23 however, it remains a minority position.24  Those few
decisions which have adopted the Dillon rationale indicate that support for
its analysis is slowly developing and that, at the very least, courts will now
be confronted with arguments on both sides of the question.
Virginia "Impact Rule" Precedents
In Hughes the Virginia Supreme Court was afforded its first opportunity to
test its "impact rule" since the 1932 decision of Bowles v. May25 which,
while upholding the Virginia "impact rule" under ordinary negligence first
adopted in 1902,26 declared:
When such fright is due to a willful, wanton, and vindictive wrong,
does not justify a wholesale rejection of the entire class of claims in which that po-
tentiality arises." Id. at 736, 441 P.2d at 917, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 77-78.
20. Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
21. Id. at 741, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
22. Id. at 746, 441 P.2d at 924, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 84.
23. D'Ambra v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 810 (D.R.I. 1973) (mother standing
near scene, but not in physical peril herself, when child was run over by U.S. Mail
truck). The court added a test for the foreseeability of a parent's presence as an addi-
tional factor in determining a defendant's duty. Id. at 820; Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bot-
tling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d 117 (Me. 1970) (foreign object in bottle caused emotional
distress. The court overturned its "impact rule," called for a general negligence ap-
proach, but added a caveat: "[Ilt [that approach] must be so limited within the
bounds of foreseeability as to preclude a host of false and groundless claims." Id. at
'121; Rodrigues v. State, 52 Haw. 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970) (emotional distress arose
from negligent damage to plaintiff's home).
24. See, e.g., Barber v. Pollock, 104 N.H. 379, 187 A.2d 788 (1963); Tobin v.
Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969); Whetham v. Bis-
marck Hospital, 197 N.W.2d 678 (N. Dak. 1972).
25. 159 Va. 419, 166 S.E. 550 (1932).
26. Connelly v. Western Union Tel. Co., 100 Va. 51, 40 S.E. 618 (1902).
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recovery is generally permitted, notwithstanding the fact that there
is no contemporaneous injury from without.
2 7
Several federal courts sitting in Virginia had considered the decision in
Bowles before the Hughes court,28 and their conflicting opinions on its
precise meaning prompted the court to reexamine the precedent. The
Hughes court's effort at clarification resulted in the new Virginia "impact
rule."
The Hughes Decision
The court had little problem disposing of the Bowles precedent, regard-
less of its original meaning. Certainly the development of the "impact
rule" throughout the United States provided ample legal precedent and prac-
tical justification for its decision to revise the rule. However, while the
court relied on extra-jurisdictional precedent to restate the "impact rule,"' 29
it made very little substantive use of these precedents when it ventured be-
yond that modernization of the rule to impose a strict prohibition against a
witness' claim for recovery. 30
The case law, particularly Dillon, gave strong support to the view that
absolute bars should not be erected since cases could easily develop whose
facts called for the plaintiff-witness recovery despite his not being within
the "zone of danger." Rather than adopt a general negligence approach
to the problem, the court cited and adopted the view of Waube v. War-
rington and cases which followed its analysis. However, it did not go be-
yond mere citation to seriously discuss the issues raised by those support-
ing precedents.
The Waube decision, the leading opinion denying such recovery, at
least mentioned a potential right of recovery when the witness himself was
also within the physical risk.81  The court in Jelley v. LaFlame,82 also
cited in Hughes, although denying recovery to the plaintiff-witness, also
hinted at a different result if the plaintiff herself had been in physical
peril. And yet when the Hughes court adopted its rule, it failed to pro-
vide for any similar contingencies. Rather the prohibitive language repre-
27. 159 Va. at 437, 166 S.E. at 556.
28. Soldinger v. United States, 247 F. Supp. 559 (E.D. Va. 1965); Ferrell v. Chesa-
peake & Ohio Ry. Emp. Hosp. Ass'n, 336 F. Supp. 833 (W.D. Va. 1971) (both opin-
ions considered willful and wanton negligence prerequisite for recovery under the
Bowles rule). Contra, Penick v. Mirro, 189 F. Supp. 947 (E.D. Va. 1960) (despite
language in Bowles, found ordinary negligence sufficient for recovery).
29. 214 Va. at 31-34, 197 S.E.2d at 217-20.
30. The decision is similar to that in Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d
84 (1970) in that the court's attempt to explicitly set out its rule caused it to expand
the rule beyond the strict holding of the case.
31. 216 Wis. at 605, 258 N.W. at 497.
32. 108 N.H. 471, 473, 238 A.2d 728, 730 (1968) (mother watched as daughter
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sents an absolute bar to recovery for plaintiff-witnesses.
Beyond a failure to provide specific exceptions for its bar to witnesses,
the court also failed to deal with the broader policy questions raised by
the Dillon v. Legg decision. The court failed to counter the Dillon thesis
that certain witnesses are foreseeable plaintiffs, that foreseeability can be
tested under general negligence theory, and that justice is best served by
considering each case on an ad hoc basis. 8  Instead the court imposed
the ban with bare citations, both to Waube and Jelley which superficially
supported its position, and to Dillon which had adopted the opposite view.
Conclusion
The "impact rule" which aroused such controversy seventy years ago has
been thoroughly repudiated. The question of a witness's right to recover
for emotional harm suffered by viewing another's physical peril, however,
is still before us and must be adequately dealt with by the courts. The
Dillon decision makes a well-reasoned, compelling argument that general
negligence theory can be adapted to these cases with equitable results that
neither overextend liability nor unjustly restrict it. However, its guide-
lines for determining foreseeabiity must be examined, applied to various
fact situations, tested for the validity and fairness of their results in actual
cases, and accepted or rejected based on that experience.8 4 The Hughes
court has not contributed to that analysis, but has instead imposed a ban
on a witness's recovery without discussion of either the Waube or Dillon
decisions.
The court was not required to decide the question of a witness's recovery
under the facts before it. Once it decided to consider the question as part
of its clarification of the "impact rule," however, its failure to present its
own analysis of the relative merits of the conflicting approaches leaves po-
tential witness-litigants in the position of being under the Hughes rule
and yet uncertain how seriously it has been considered and how strongly
the court is convinced of its merit. The Hughes decision has not succeeded
in its attempt to clarify the rule, but instead the "impact rule" remains in
controversy.
Thomas C. Sullivan
killed by truck. Recovery was denied on public policy grounds--possible limitations
considered too arbitrary by the court.).
33. 68 Cal. 2d at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920-21, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80-81.
34. See D'Ambra v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 810, 820-21 (D.R.I. 1973) for an
analysis of four later California cases applying Dillon, in only one of which did the
plaintiff-witness recover.
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